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Even an Activated Long-Term Memory System Still Needs a Separate
Short-Term Store: A Reply to Cowan (2019)
Dennis Norris
University of Cambridge
In Norris (2017), I explained why the notion of activated LTM (long-term memory) combined with a focus
of attention was unable to perform the computations required to support short-term memory (STM) and argued
that those extra computations must require a separate STM system. Cowan (2019) made the alternative
proposal that this full set of computations is better conceptualized as a unitary system of activated LTM. To
this he added a pointer system, the ability to perform variable binding, and an unspecified model of STM that
acts as a front end to LTM. This appears to be simply an exercise in relabeling. Furthermore, without a
computational specification of how the components work, the model lacks the ability to simulate even the
most basic STM phenomena. If the model were specified in more detail it seems almost inevitable that it
would contain something instantly recognizable as an STM system.
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When I quoted Cowan and Chen (2008) as saying that “although
the mechanisms of short-term memory are separate from those of
long-term memory, they are closely related” (their p. 104), I
thought Neslon Cowan and I had little to disagree about. I also
consider Cowan’s (1988, 1999) idea of a focus of attention (FoA)
to be a useful way of thinking about control processes in working
memory. So why is it that Cowan (2019) now feels the need to
respond to the arguments I presented in Norris (2017)? The frame-
work he presents builds on Cowan (1999) and Cowan (1988), and
he now argues that there is no separation between short-term and
long-term memory systems after all. He does this by endowing
both the FoA and aLTM (activated LTM) with additional proper-
ties and an unspecified model of STM. In order to dispense with a
separate STM he then deems all of this to be a unitary LTM
system. Cowan has not shown that there is no need for a separate
STM system, he has just redefined it out of existence.
Norris (2017) highlighted the inadequacy of models that em-
body the claim that STM can be supported entirely by aLTM. In
that article, I explained that the computational requirements of
storing information over the short-term entail additional mech-
anisms to activation. In particular, memory must be able to
support the construction of novel representations that have no
preexisting representation in LTM. At the very least, this re-
quires the ability to store multiple tokens of a given type (“the
problem of two”) and to perform variable binding. Any LTM
system must be supplemented by extra mechanisms that are
required to store information over the short term. Consider the
need to store multiple tokens of a given type. I gave the
example of the easily remembered sentence, “Buffalo buffalo
buffalo buffalo buffalo” and argued that it was implausible to
assume that LTM stored five copies of the phonological word
form /bfələυ/, just in case one was ever asked to repeat this
sentence. The binding problem can be exemplified by the
sentence, “The young boy saw the boy who was singing.” As I
noted in my original article (Norris, 2017),
Here the problem is not simply representing the order of the words,
but appreciating that there are two different boys, one of whom is
singing and one of whom is young. It is necessary to represent both
multiple tokens and the bindings between each of those tokens and
other components of the sentence. (p. 1000)
Similar problems arise in the case of visual STM, where memory
for an array of random dots of the same size requires binding
multiple tokens of dots to their locations.
Cowan (2019) agreed that the simple notion of STM as activated
LTM cannot solve these problems. But even in the abstract of his
commentary, he conceded the need for separate short-term storage
system when he stated that “models of STM storage can serve as the
front end of an LTM learning system rather than being separate”
(Cowan, 2019, p. 822). The point is reinforced later when he stated
that
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[t]he viability of an approach involving aLTM with new learning does
not depend on coming up with a separate serial order memory model
specifically within the embedded-processes framework, inasmuch an
adequate model of serial order memory in STM formulated by another
investigator also could also serve as the long-term learning mecha-
nism. (p. 832)
Cowan (2019) recognized the need for a model of STM, but
instead of considering it a separate STM system, he instead tried to
take an existing model of STM and call it a front end to aLTM. In
Table 1 he states “-STM-copy theories might be reclassified as the
front end of long-term learning”. This is simply an exercise in
relabeling.1
Even though Cowan’s acceptance of the need to incorporate a
model of STM has undermined his own case for calling his theory
aLTM, it is still worth taking a closer look at the theory to examine
how the various components work together and how they relate to
standard two-store models. First, it should be noted that for more
than 25 years there has been an expectation that new theories of
STM should be presented as computational models (Burgess &
Hitch, 1992; Henson, 1998; Page & Norris, 1998, for review see
Hurlstone, Hitch, & Baddeley, 2014). This has at least two advan-
tages. First, we can run simulations to assure ourselves that the
model really can simulate the target data set. Second, it doesn’t
matter too much if we cannot pigeonhole the model into categories
such as, for example, “two-store,” “one store,” or “uses activa-
tion.” We can see how it works, and then, should we wish to do so,
assign it an informative label. Cowan reversed this process: He
started with a label and then asserted that there might exist a model
that could be labeled in this way. If the final step were to construct
a computational model that fit the label and simulated the data, I
would have few complaints. I might have been tempted to question
whether the label seemed appropriate, but at least I would have
been convinced that the model could work, which is the important
thing. Could there be a model that works according to the princi-
ples Cowan has espoused? Given that the “model” is expressed
only verbally, we cannot be sure.
Cowan’s unitary model has five core features, aLTM, FoA, a
pointer system, rapid learning, and a model of STM. With these
extra features, aLTM is now assumed to be able to perform
variable binding, to instantiate multiple tokens, and to create
temporary representations that can support performance in STM
tasks. The extras are there to fulfill the function of an STM system
that performs computational functions that are distinct from those
of LTM. They allow Cowan to smuggle STM into LTM.
Activation
The core feature of aLTM is activation. In Norris (2017), I
suggested that “it seems reasonable to ask what computational
function is performed by activation that enables it to encode,
maintain, and retrieve information from STM” (p. 998). Cowan
(2019) replied that “[a]ctivation, then, is simply the degree of
availability for retrieval” (p. 834). But this doesn’t answer the
question about the computational function served by activation.
What it says is that given some behavior (retrieval), we can infer
that LTM is in some underlying state called activation—but all we
know about that state of activation is that it is something that
caused the behavior that we used to infer that activation in the first
place. We’re no wiser about the computational role of activation.
The absence of any clear computational definition of activation is
apparent in Cowan’s concluding sentence, which reads as follows:
“The exact meaning of activation and of the two alternatives may
change as the pursuit to test them continues; changing definitions
is a legitimate part of the progression of a science” (p. 842). In
other words, we can always use the term activation, because we
can always change what it means.
The FoA and Pointers to aLTM
Cowan (2019) wrote the following:
The information held with the FoA could be described as a structured
set of pointers, it would also serve as a portal to LTM learning. For
example, to learn the list of digits 739482, the individual might
memorize 739, then 48, and then the association between these
segments as 739–48, subsequently incorporating the last digit to
encode 739–48–2. That reiterative process . . . would presumably be
available for immediate recall. (p. 829)
I take this to mean that pointers do the job of representing se-
quences. This gives the FoA all of the computational power needed
by an STM system, but Cowan still declined to call it STM. Given
that aLTM does not have a representation of 979482 to begin with,
the focus of attention must be focusing on something other than a
subset of aLTM. The only other thing available is the representa-
tion stored in an STM system.
Norris (2017) discussed the issue of how to best label a system
that relies on pointers:
If there is a system where the short-term store (STS) contains pointers
to LTM, should we really call this an STS, or is it just a pointer
system? My own inclination is to stick with the term STS, as the
pointers are doing all of the hard work. (p. 1003)
But Cowan went beyond having a simple set of pointers and
proposed that “a pointer system is expected in which a structured
set of references to information in aLTM would be established . . .
[and where] a set of items is apprehended with the FoA and then
off-loaded into new LTM representations” (p. 838). Here, the hard
work in not being done by pointers, but by a system labeled FoA
which can construct structured representations and offload them to
LTM. FoA has been allowed to subsume the processes normally
considered to be part of a separate STM system. My preference
remains to call that an STM system.
The Role of Rapid Learning
Cowan proposed that some of the problems with aLTM can be
overcome by invoking rapid learning and assumes that
information can be learned quite quickly, so newly learned structures
(such as the serial positions of list items, spatial positions of array
items, or binding of items to semantic roles) is processed by the FoA
and is concurrently learned, resulting in new aLTM material that can
be used on the trial (though learning may be imperfect, and later
retrieval depends on interference and on retrieval cues). (p. 826)
1 Cowan (2019) presented 11 arguments for a separate copy of infor-
mation in STM (see his Table 1). Table 1 in the current article presents my
response to Cowan’s commentary, along with his description of the orig-
inal argument. I have ignored Arguments 5 through 7, as I did not make
them.
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Table 1
Responses to the Arguments for a Separate Copy of Information in STM
Description of argument Cowan’s (2019) response against separate copy My response to Cowan (2019)
1. Storage of new
configurations is needed in
STM
Everyone recognizes that there must be new,
rapid learning of information in STM tasks
(e.g., Keppel & Underwood, 1962), and the
newly learned information is typically still in
an activated state, aLTM, at the time of test
(Cowan, 1999).
Few could disagree with the first part of this response, but it
fails to address the question posed. The original question
concerned the need to store novel representations that had no
preexisting representation in LTM. This cannot be achieved
just by assuming that the learning is rapid. I also pointed out
that there must be continual long-term learning. On first
encounter with some new event there must be some long-term
learning, otherwise every encounter would be the same as the
first, and learning would never get underway.
2. Token representations cannot
be represented in aLTM,
only types
aLTM includes rapid learning of information,
and therefore can include the same episodic
information about tokens that one adds to
LTM (Cowan, 1999; Nairne & Neath, 2001)
The case against aLTM applies regardless of the speed of aLTM.
It needs more than go-faster stripes—it simply does not have
the necessary representational capacity to do the job. Adding
that extra capacity turns it into an STM system. What we need
to know is how rapid learning works and exactly how it is
supposed to solve the problem.
3. No extant model of STM
performance based on aLTM
Including new learning as part of aLTM changes
the need because separate STM copy theories
might be reclassified as the front end of long-
term learning. Many long-term learning models
exist. A few models deal explicitly with aspects
of aLTM and new learning (Anderson &
Matessa, 1997; Cowan, Rouder, Blume, &
Saults, 2012).
The need is as great as ever. There are no computational models
of STM performance based simply on activated LTM. The
models cited are not models of aLTM, and the models in
Cowan et al. (2012) do not simulate any of the benchmark
phenomena of STM. To resort to reclassifying models of STM
as part of aLTM is to admit defeat.
4. STM recall differs from
LTM recall in its properties
There is evidence that long-term learning with
repetition heavily relies on item-item
associations (Zaromb et al., 2006) not just item-
position as implied by Cumming, Page, and
Norris (2003). LTM with reduced interference
looks more similar to STM (Dewar, Alber,
Butler, Cowan, & Della Sala, 2012; Ecker,
Brown, & Lewandowsky, 2015; Ecker, Tay, &
Brown, 2015). Unlike the usual procedures,
STM can use semantic information (Potter,
1993), and LTM can be made to use
phonological cues when such cues are best-
suited to the encoding context (Morris,
Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Order retention
suffers in dyslexia within both STM and LTM
(Martinez Perez, Majerus, & Poncelet, 2013;
Szmalec, Loncke, & Page, 2011).
Cumming, Page, and Norris (2003) was not cited in Norris
(2017), and it is not clear how item-item versus item-position
associations has any bearing on the issue. I did point out that
that phonological confusions in STM only occur at short
retention intervals, after which confusions are likely to be
semantic
8. Variable binding must be
encoded into STM
Patients with hippocampal damage and LTM
deficiency also show a deficit in variable
binding, in sentence comprehension requiring
variable binding for pronoun assignment
(Kurczek, Brown-Schmidt, & Duff, 2013)
The argument was that we must have some way of performing
variable binding. aLTM fails to offer an account of how these
computations might be performed. Given Cowan’s reluctance to
accept the standard interpretation of neuropsychological evidence
for a separation between STM and LTM, it is surprising to find
him placing such weight on the neuropsychological evidence
from a single study. In their abstract Kurczek et al. (2013) say
“This finding suggests that the hippocampus plays a role in
maintaining and integrating information even over a very short
discourse history”. Even if the conclusion were that the
hippocampus, and only the hippocampus, plays a role in binding,
any further conclusion about the role of aLTM depends on the
additional assumption that the hippocampus is exclusively
involved in LTM and could not be construed as implementing
any part of a separate STM process.
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However, increasing the speed of learning does not help aLTM
escape its predicament. Rapid learning relies entirely on represen-
tations constructed by the FoA, but these must be different from
the representations in aLTM, otherwise there would be no need for
rapid learning. The FoA has now been given all of the power and
storage capabilities of a separate STM system. If you can rapidly
learn 979482 you have already managed to solve the problem of
two (there are two 9s). Cowan and I agree that this cannot be done
with aLTM alone.
A Model of STM as the Front end of LTM
When Cowan suggests that a model of STM might form the
front end of LTM learning it is not clear whether he has a
particular model of STM in mind. It is also unclear what STM
can do that is beyond the capabilities of the newly endowed
FoA. The model he devotes most space to discussing is Burgess
and Hitch (2006). Like all connectionist models of STM, their
model has multiple components with separate interacting layers
of nodes. The layers perform the task of representing the
specific sequence of items or events and transferring those
temporarily constructed representations into LTM. Much the
same happens in the model of Page and Norris (2009). As with
all computational models of STM, there is a lot of weighty
structure here. Cowan argued that the entirety of this mecha-
nism can be reclassified as aLTM or FoA.
Conclusion
The conclusion of this response remains the same as that of
Norris (2017): A simple activation process would be unable to
solve the “problem of two” or to store novel representations.
Thus, it follows that any model that places an emphasis on
storage by activated LTM must be supplemented by some
additional mechanism that can represent multiple tokens and
serial order. That additional mechanism must be able to perform
the variable-binding operation required to construct novel rep-
resentations and would then amount to what has been conven-
tionally thought of as a short-term store. In fact, the resulting
model would look very much like existing computational mod-
els of STM. Some might still prefer to describe this by saying
that STM is aLTM. If it is made clear that there must be some
additional mechanism and how that mechanism operates, at
least we would know what they mean.
Cowan (2019) admitted that there must be some additional
mechanism, but with only a verbal description to go on, it is far
from clear what he meant or even whether his proposals would
actually work. It seems likely that if his proposals were incorpo-
rated into an explicit computational model, they would work only
to the extent that they instantiated the mechanism of some existing
model of STM. This is apparent in the claim that “separate STM
copy theories might be reclassified as the front end of long-term
learning” (p. 824). In other words, you need a separate STM
Table 1 (continued)
Description of argument Cowan’s (2019) response against separate copy My response to Cowan (2019)
9. Neuropathological deficits
distinguish STM from LTM
Specific deficits in STM performance could come
from deficient processes specific to STM
maintenance (e.g., rehearsal: Cowan, 1988; or
other kinds of deficient coding: Cermak, 1997;
Morey & Bieler, 2013; Morey, Rhodes, &
Cowan, 2019; Ruchkin, Grafman, Cameron, &
Berndt, 2003). Also, LTM procedure used have
not closely matched STM procedures used.
It is always possibly to attribute damage to stores to damage to
processes. One need only claim that there is one process for
reading out information in the short term and one for the long
term. The neuropsychological evidence has recently been the
subject of a special issue of the journal Cortex (Papagno &
Shallice, 2019). In particular, see Logie (2019) for a critique
of Morey, Rhodes, and Cowan (2019). Interestingly, the main
theme in that issue is not whether STM and LTM are separate,
which was largely taken for granted. The papers focus on
presenting evidence for further fractionation of STM and
working memory into separate buffers.
10. Tasks are impure measures
of either STM or LTM
LTM learning may make use of use the focus of
attention once for subspan lists but reiteratively
for supraspan lists (Rhodes & Cowan, 2018),
and the reiterative process could be impaired.
The response doesn’t speak to the argument. Given that tasks are
impure measures (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), it is hard to design
tasks that involve only STM or only LTM. That is, this is a
statement about what follows from the assumption of separate
stores.
11. Neuroimaging as a
correlation fallacy
The scientific method seeks the most parsimonious
and adequate theory that can accommodate all
of the evidence, including correlations and
causation. The neuroscientific evidence for the
embedded-processes approach includes
correlational neuroimaging-behavior
correspondences (e.g., Chein & Fiez, 2010;
Cowan, 2011; Cowan et al., 2011; Kalm &
Norris, 2017; Lewis-Peacock, Drysdale,
Oberauer, & Postle, 2012; Li, Christ, & Cowan,
2014; Majerus et al., 2016; Öztekin, McElree,
Staresina, & Davachi, 2008) and causal TMS
evidence (Postle et al., 2006; Rose et al., 2016).
Given that there are no pure measures, neuroimaging data that
implicate brain regions purported to be involved in LTM in
STM tasks, is simply correlational and is to be expected from
the two-store view. Such data should therefore not be taken as
evidence that regions assumed to be responsible for LTM are
performing the STM task.
The scientific method does indeed seek the most parsimonious
and adequate theory. However, aLTM is not formulated with
sufficient precision to know whether it can accommodate the
evidence. The appropriate metric of parsimony is not simply a
count of the number of stores that a theory claims to have. We
also have to count the number of ad hoc assumptions. By
adding extra assumption and an extra STM model, the aLTM
seems far from parsimonious. It has the potential to explain
almost anything. Embedded memory systems will be subject to
the same computational constraints as any other STM system.
Calling them aLTM is simply another exercise in relabelling.
Note. STM  short-term memory; aLTM  activated long-term memory; LTM  long-term memory.
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system. STM and LTM are still different, unless you “pretend”
otherwise.
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